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Rising Temperatures, Melting Incomes: Country-Specific Macroeconomic Effects of Climate Scenarios*

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1 Introduction

Climate change—marked by rising average temperatures, shifting precipitation patterns, and more frequent and intense extreme weather events—poses a critical challenge to the global economy. While the physical manifestations of climate change are visibly alarming, its macroeconomic implications are equally significant but difficult to quantify.[1] This paper estimates the *country-specific* annual per-capita GDP losses from global warming based on the methodology in Kahn et al. (2021a), but using a wider and more up-to-date set of climate scenarios under different mitigation (i.e., reducing greenhouse gas emissions), adaptation (i.e., adjusting to climate change impacts), and climate variability (i.e., fluctuations in weather patterns) assumptions. We focus on the cumulative macroeconomic impact of slow-moving, long-term shifts in temperatures above historical norms, but abstract from quantifying the GDP impact of extreme weather events. We compare our income loss estimates with those from select papers in the literature using a common baseline scenario.

Climate change has a wide range of impacts, manifesting both in gradual, long-term shifts in climate and through sudden, extreme weather events. While understanding the economic impact of rising temperatures is crucial for policy design, the most used estimates in the literature differ by an order of magnitude. This wide range arises from a disagreement about whether a temperature increase will affect GDP levels or GDP growth rates (Figure 1a) and from different model specifications (including how climate variability and adaptation are considered). Most papers that relate temperature to GDP levels yield income loss estimates that are relatively small. More recent studies, that relate temperature to GDP growth (possibly nonlinearly), show that a shift to a higher (non-decreasing) temperature reduces per capita output growth significantly (with compounding level effects over time) compared to a "no further warming" baseline.[2,3] With the exception of Kahn et al. (2021a), current panel models do not explicitly assess the role of climate variability in the estimation of income losses from rising temperatures. Understanding interannual and interdecadal natural climate variability is crucial for GDP impact assessments, not least because climate change significantly alters the frequency, intensity, and patterns of climate variability.[4] We distinguish between a

[1]Most models are unable to account for tipping points, non-market damages (e.g., mortality, conflicts, food insecurity), and spillovers. Inference about damages up to 2100 based on past data is inherently difficult.

[2]The Network for Greening the Financial Sector (NGFS) measures the global GDP impact of climate change relative to a baseline scenario "in which climate change does not occur". Burke et al. (2015) argue that "if future adaptation mimics past adaptation, unmitigated warming is expected to reshape the global economy by reducing average global incomes roughly 23% by 2100 and widening global income inequality, relative to scenarios without climate change".

[3]According to Tol (2024), Nath et al. (2023) and Kahn et al. (2021b), the hypothesis that a one-off rise in temperature affects the growth rate of the economy permanently is inconsistent with growth theory.

[4]Interannual climate variability is observed as changes in climate patterns from one year to the next. A well-known example is the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which includes both El Niño and La Niña events (see, for instance, Cashin et al. (2017) and Generoso et al. (2020) for details). Interdecadal climate variability refers to fluctuations in climate that occur over periods of several decades. Examples include the

one-off shift to permanently higher temperatures and persistent temperature increases above historical norms (i.e., climate vs. climate change); model adaptation implicitly (by varying adaptation speeds from one decade to a century) and climate variability explicitly (i.e., by accounting for the natural fluctuations of temperature around its rising trend); and conduct a range of counterfactual exercises relative to a baseline under which temperature in each country increases according to its historical trend of 1960–2014.

Kahn et al. (2021a) link deviations of temperature (weather) from its 30-year moving averages (climate) to GDP per capita and show that a persistent increase in temperature above its historical norm for an extended period of time (i.e., climate change) is associated with lower economic growth in the long run—suggesting that a temporary temperature shock will only have short-term growth effects but climate change, by shifting the long-term average and variability of weather, could impact an economy's ability to grow in the long-term. The impact on GDP per capita accumulates as long as temperatures keep rising and adaptation is gradual, but they will eventually plateau if temperatures stabilize. They calculate annual income losses from climate change as an integral of weather anomalies over time for 174 countries under different climate scenarios. They estimate that if global temperature increases by 0.04°C per year under a high-emissions scenario (RCP 8.5) persistently, real GDP per capita worldwide would decline by 7–13% by 2100 compared to a baseline in which temperatures increase according to their 1960-2014 trends (Figure 1b). Adhering to the goals of the Paris Agreement and limiting the temperature increase to 0.01°C annually would reduce the loss to approximately 1%. Adaptation to climate change can reduce these negative long-term growth effects, but it is highly unlikely to offset them entirely.[5]

Given that the planet has already warmed by 1.2°C compared to pre-industrial averages, its impact on GDP per capita (alongside past adaptation) is reflected in historical growth rates. We estimate a weighted-average global income loss of 2 percent (USD 1.6 trillion) from above-norm temperature increases over 1960-2014. However, global warming is projected to accelerate under various IPCC climate scenarios, and hence its impact on the economy will be more detrimental than in the past, unless countries close the mitigation ambition and policy implementation gaps that are needed to abide by the Paris agreement goals. Climate scenarios are plausible descriptions of how the future might unfold under different levels of radiative forcing (the warming effect caused by greenhouse gases) and socio-economic pathways. We use the latest IPCC climate scenarios in our counterfactual exercises to better reflect uncertainties of climate change, technological pathways, and policies. We investigate

Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) and the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO).

[5]See also Mohaddes et al. (2023) who provided evidence for the damage that climate change causes in the United States using within-country data on GSP, GSP per capita, labour productivity and employment as well as output growth in ten economic sectors (such as agriculture, construction, manufacturing, services, retail and wholesale trade). They show that while certain sectors in the U.S. economy might have adapted to higher temperatures, economic activity in the U.S. overall and at the sectoral level continues to be sensitive to deviations of temperature and precipitation from their historical norms.

Figure 1: GDP Impact of Increases in Temperature: Level vs. Growth Effects



Notes: Figure 1b shows the results in Kahn et al. (2021a) under RCP8.5 with and without climate variability.

the cumulative income effects of continuous above-norm temperature increases[6] over 2015–2100 relative to a baseline under which temperature in each country increases according to its trend of 1960–2014. We also report the associated income losses relative to a scenario without climate change and with extremely-slow adaptation.

Prior research projects the GDP impact of temperature increases for some future year, typically 2100, assuming a "no further warming" counterfactual (e.g., Burke et al. 2015; Kalkuhl and Wenz 2020). Since there are no pathways to a scenario in which baseline temperatures remain constant, we compare the per capita GDP impact of temperature increases under different climate scenarios to a baseline under which temperature in each country rises according to its historical trend of 1960–2014. We find that the global income effects of persistent increases in average temperatures by 0.04°C per year, assuming very limited mitigation and adaptation action, ranges from -10% to -11% by the end of this century. Furthermore, climate variability amplifies the projected income losses, with estimates surging to 12-14% globally with significant variations across countries.[7] While adaptation presents a viable pathway to reducing the detrimental long-term growth effects of climate change, it falls short of completely neutralizing these impacts. We, therefore, underscore the pressing need for climate change mitigation policies to slowing global warming. Abiding by the Paris Agreement goals, thereby limiting the temperature increase to 0.01 degrees Celsius per year, generate a positive income gain of about 0.25 percent globally. To have better compara-

[6] We assume that GDP per capita in each country is affected by temperature only when it deviates from its historical norm (which also serve as country-specific but time-varying thresholds or climates).

[7] The upper bound of these losses allow for temperature increases to affect the variability of temperature shocks commensurately. Accounting for transition risks (in addition to physical risks) would lead to larger losses (especially for advanced economies, see, for instance, Klusak et al. 2023 and Agarwala et al. 2021).

bility to the literature, we also conduct an exercise in which adaptation is assumed to be extremely slow (i.e., we use 100-year historical norms) and income losses from temperature increases based on the 1960–2014 trends are compared to a "no further warming" scenario. Our analysis results in per capita income losses of 20 to 24 percent under the high-emissions climate scenarios by 2100, with significant variations across countries.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the IPCC climate scenarios. Section 3 discusses the methodology used for the counterfactual analysis. Section 4 estimates the cumulative income effects of annual increases in temperatures under different climate scenarios. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.

2 Climate Scenarios

Climate scenarios are plausible descriptions of how the future might unfold under different levels of radiative forcing (the warming effect caused by greenhouse gases) and socio-economic pathways. Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) are scenarios of future greenhouse gas concentrations that describe the level of radiative forcing by 2100. Four independent radiative forcing pathways or RCPs were created by modelling groups to produce distinct and discernible climate change outcomes – RCP2.6, RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 – each named after the approximate radiative forcing in 2100.

Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) describe potential future pathways of societal development, focusing on factors like population and education, urbanization, and economic development. The SSPs provide a framework for understanding how different socioeconomic conditions could influence greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Five SSPs have been developed by the scientific community to span a range of outcomes that describe the challenges of climate change mitigation and adaptation.

SSPs are meant to be used in combination with RCPs in a scenario matrix to explore the impact of climate change mitigation on future global warming. SSPs without RCPs lack a specific quantitative translation to temperature, making comparisons across SSP scenarios difficult. RCPs without explicit SSPs assume an unspecified socio-economic context (energy, land-use, and emission pathways), limiting their ability to fully portray the nuances of future societal dynamics impacting emissions.

Within the RCP-SSP scenario matrix (Table 1), this paper focuses on SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, and SSP5-8.5. The choice of climate scenarios is informed by the baseline global temperature pathways under current policies as well as (un)mitigated pathways. The first Global Stocktake (IPCC 2023) estimates that global temperature increase will be in the range of 2.1-2.8°C by 2100 with implementation of the latest nationally determined contributions. However, current policies are not consistent with these commitments, which means that the world is set to experience a temperature increase at the upper bound of the above range. This is largely consistent with SSP2-4.5 and close to the 1960-2014 trend temperature increase baseline. An aspirational global warming scenario consistent with Paris Agreement is also considered (SSP1-2.6). Moreover, two pessimistic scenarios reflecting policy reversals (SSP3-7.0), or continued expansion of fossil fuels (SSP5-8.5) are used to highlight the risks of faster temperature increases. The 90th percentile of the ensemble of climate models for SSP3-7.0— that is, SSP3-7.0 (90th percentile)— is used to highlight a "hotter" world as SSP5-8.5 is deemed unrealistic.

Table 1: How are RCPs, SSPs, and NFGS Scenarios Related?

	Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP)				
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) w/m^2	SSP1	SSP2	SSP3	SSP4	SSP5
8.5					SSP5-Baseline
8.0					
7.5					
7.0			SSP3-Baseline		
6.5		SSP2-Baseline		SSP4-Baseline	
6.0	SSP1-6.0	SSP2-6.0	SSP3-6.0	SSP4-6.0	SSP5-6.0
5.5	SSP1-Baseline				
5.0					
4.5	SSP1-4.5	SSP2-4.5	SSP3-4.5	SSP4-4.5	SSP5-4.5
4.0					
3.4	SSP1-3.4	SSP2-3.4	SSP3-3.4	SSP4-3.4	SSP5-3.4
3.0					
2.6	SSP1-2.6	SSP2-2.6		SSP4-2.6	SSP5-2.6
1.9	SSP1-1.9	SSP2-1.9		SSP4-1.9	SSP5-1.9
		NGFS Scenarios			

Sources: The authors, Riahi et al. (2017), and O'Neill et al. (2016).

3 Counterfactual Analysis

We perform a number of counterfactual exercises to measure the cumulative output per capita effects of persistent increases in annual temperatures above their norms over the period 2015–2100 using the Half-Panel Jackknife Fixed Effects (HPJ-FE) estimates of the following Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model:

$$\varphi(L)\,\Delta y_{it} = a_i + \beta(L)\Delta x_{it}(m) + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where y_{it} is the log of real GDP per capita of country i in year t, a_i is the country-specific fixed effect, $x_{it}(m) = \left|T_{it} - T^*_{it-1}(m)\right|$ measures the absolute value of temperature relative to its historical norms, T_{it} is the population-weighted average temperature of country i in year t, and $T^*_{i,t-1}(m) = \frac{1}{m}\sum_{\ell=1}^{m} T_{i,t-\ell}$ is the time-varying historical norm of temperature over the preceding m years in each t. Climate norms are typically computed using 30-year moving averages (see, for instance, Arguez et al. 2012 and Vose et al. 2014), but to check the robustness of our results and model adaptation, we also consider historical norms computed using moving averages with $m = 10, 20, 40, 50$, and 100.[8] $\varphi(L) = 1 - \sum_{\ell=1}^{4} \varphi_\ell L^l$, $\beta(L) = \sum_{\ell=0}^{4} \beta_\ell L^l$, and L is the lag operator.

Pre-multiplying both sides of the above equation by the inverse of $\varphi(L)$ yields

$$\Delta y_{it} = \tilde{a}_i + \psi(L)\Delta x_{it} + \vartheta(L)\varepsilon_{it}, \tag{1}$$

where $\tilde{a}_i = \varphi(1)^{-1}a_i$, $\vartheta(L) = \vartheta_0 + \vartheta_1 L + \vartheta_2 L^2 + \ldots$ and $\psi(L) = \varphi(L)^{-1}\beta(L) = \psi_0 + \psi_1 L + \psi_2 L^2 + \ldots$ for $j = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$.[9]

The counterfactual effects of climate change can be derived by comparing the output trajectory of country i over the period $T+1$ to $T+h$ under the baseline scenario denoted by $b^0_{T_i}$ and $\sigma^0_{T_i}$, with an alternative expected trajectory having the counterfactual values of $b^1_{T_i}$ and $\sigma^1_{T_i}$. Denoting the values of x_{it} for $t = T+1, T+2, ..., T+h$ under these two scenarios by $\mathbf{x}^0_{i,T+1,T+h} = \left\{x^0_{i,T+1}, x^0_{i,T+2}, ..., x^0_{i,T+h}\right\}$, and $\mathbf{x}^1_{i,T+1,T+h} = \left\{x^1_{i,T+1}, x^1_{i,T+2}, ..., x^1_{i,T+h}\right\}$, the counterfactual output change can be written as

$$\xi_{i,T+h} = \mathbb{E}\left(y_{i,T+h} \left| \mathcal{F}_{i,T}, \mathbf{x}^1_{i,T+1,T+h}\right.\right) - \mathbb{E}\left(y_{i,T+h} \left| \mathcal{F}_{i,T}, \mathbf{x}^0_{i,T+1,T+h}\right.\right),$$

where $\mathcal{F}_{iT} = (y_{iT}, y_{i,T-1}, y_{i,T-2}, ...; x_{iT}, x_{i,T-1}, x_{i,T-2}, ...)$. Cumulating both sides of (1) from $t = T+1$ to $T+h$ and taking conditional expectations under the two scenarios we have

$$\xi_{i,T+h} = \sum_{j=1}^{h} \psi_{h-j}\left(x^1_{i,T+j} - x^0_{i,T+j}\right), \tag{2}$$

The impact of climate change clearly depends on the magnitude of $x^1_{i,T+j} - x^0_{i,T+j}$.

We consider the output effects of country-specific average annual increases in temperatures over the period 2015–2100 under various SSP scenarios, and compare them with a baseline scenario under which temperature in each country increases according to its historical trend of 1960–2014. However, owing to the non-linear nature of our output-growth specification, changes in trend temperature do not translate on a one-to-one basis to absolute changes in temperature. Future temperature changes over the counterfactual horizon, $T+j$, $j = 1, 2, ...$ can be represented by

$$T_{i,T+j} = a_{Ti} + b_{Ti,j}\left(T+j\right) + \upsilon_{Ti,T+j}, \text{ for } j = 1, 2, ..., \tag{3}$$

[8] $m = 30$ also corresponds to the official World Meteorological Organization definition of climate.
[9] We are suppressing the dependence of x_{it} on m to simplify the exposition.

where we allow for the trend change in the temperature to vary over time. Suppose also that, as before, the historical norm variable associated with $T_{i,T+j}$, namely $T^*_{i,T+j-1}(m)$, is constructed using the past m years. Then it is easy to show that

$$T_{i,T+j} - T^*_{i,T+j-1}(m) = \left(\frac{m+1}{2}\right) b_{Ti,j} + \left(v_{Ti,T+j} - \bar{v}_{Ti,T+j-1,m}\right),\ j = 1, 2, ..., h, \tag{4}$$

where $\bar{v}_{Ti,T+j-1,m} = m^{-1}\sum_{s=1}^{m} v_{Ti,T+j-s}$. The realised values of $\left|T_{i,T+j} - T^*_{i,T+j-1}(m)\right|$ depend on the probability distribution of weather shocks, $v_{Ti,T+j}$, as well as the trend change in temperature, given by $b_{Ti,j}$. As a first order approximation, and in order to obtain analytic expressions, we assume that temperature shocks, $v_{Ti,T+j}$, over $j = 1, 2, ...$, are serially uncorrelated, Gaussian random variables with zero means and variances, σ^2_{Ti}. Under these assumptions and using the results in Lemma 3.1 of Dhyne et al. (2011), we have

$$\mathbb{E}\left|T_{i,T+j} - T^*_{i,T+j-1}(m)\right| = \mu_{Ti,j}\left[\Phi\left(\frac{\mu_{Ti,j}}{\omega_{Ti}}\right) - \Phi\left(\frac{-\mu_{Ti,j}}{\omega_{Ti}}\right)\right] + 2\omega_{Ti}\phi\left(\frac{\mu_{Ti,j}}{\omega_{Ti}}\right) = g_{Ti}(m, b_{Ti,j}, \sigma_{Ti}) \tag{5}$$

where $\Phi(.)$ and $\phi(.)$ are the cumulative and density distribution functions of a standard Normal variate, respectively, and

$$\mu_{Ti,j} = \left(\frac{m+1}{2}\right) b_{Ti,j}, \text{ and } \omega^2_{Ti} = \sigma^2_{Ti}\left(1 + \frac{1}{m}\right).$$

It is clear from the above expressions that the responses of our climate variables to a postulated rise in temperature most crucially depend on the volatility of temperature around its trend, σ_{Ti}, which differs markedly across countries.

For the baseline scenario, we set $m = 30$ and consider the following counterfactual *country-specific* changes in the trend temperature over the period $T + j$, for $j = 1, 2, ..., H$, as compared to the historical trend rise in temperature (namely b^0_{Ti}):

$$b^1_{Ti,j} = T_{i,T+j} - T_{i,T+j-1} = b^0_{Ti} + jd_i, \text{ for all } j = 1, 2..., H, \tag{6}$$

where d_i is the average incremental change in the trend rise in temperature for country i. We set d_i to ensure that the average rise in temperature over the counterfactual period in country i is equal to the hypothesised value of b^1_{Ti}, and note that

$$b^1_{Ti} = H^{-1}\sum_{j=1}^{H} b^1_{Ti,j} = H^{-1}\sum_{j=1}^{H}\left(T_{i,T+j} - T_{i,T+j-1}\right) = \frac{T_{i,T+H} - T_{i,T}}{H}, \tag{7}$$

where $T_{i,T+H}$ denotes the level of temperature at the end of the counterfactual period. Averaging (6) over j we have

$$d_i = \frac{2\left(b^1_{Ti} - b^0_{Ti}\right)}{H+1}. \tag{8}$$

In our empirical application we set $T_{i,T+H} = T_{i,2099}$ and $T_{i,T+1} = T_{i,2015}$, with implied $H = 85$. For $T_{i,2099}$, for $i = 1, 2, ..., N$, we consider five sets of values based on IPCC's projections under SSP scenarios (see Table 1). In effect, this specification assumes that over the counterfactual period temperature in country i increases by jd_i per annum over the period $T+1$ to $T+j$, relative to its historical trend value of b^0_{Ti}.

We also assume that the postulated trend rise in temperature, specified in (6), does not affect the volatility of temperature shocks, and set $\sigma^1_{Ti,j}$ to its pre-counterfactual value of σ^0_{Ti}. This is a conservative assumption and most likely will result in an under-estimation of the adverse effects of temperature increases, since one would expect rising temperature to be associated with an increase in volatility.[10] With these considerations in mind, and using (2), the mean counterfactual impact of the temperature change on output is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta_{ih}\left(d_i\right) &= \mathbb{E}\left(y^1_{i,T+h} \left| \mathcal{F}_{i,T}\right.\right) - \mathbb{E}\left(y^0_{i,T+h} \left| \mathcal{F}_{i,T}\right.\right) \\
&= \sum_{j=1}^{h} \psi_{h-j}\left[g_{Ti}(m, b^0_{Ti} + jd_i, \sigma^0_{Ti}) - g_{Ti}(m, b^0_{Ti}, \sigma^0_{Ti})\right],
\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

where we base the estimates of b^0_{Ti} and σ^0_{Ti} on the pre-counterfactual period 1960-2014, and use

$$g^1_{Ti}(m, b^1_{Ti,j}, \sigma^0_{Ti}) = \mu^1_{Ti,j}\left[\Phi\left(\frac{\mu^1_{Ti,j}}{\omega^0_{Ti}}\right) - \Phi\left(\frac{-\mu^1_{Ti,j}}{\omega^0_{Ti}}\right)\right] + 2\omega^0_{Ti}\phi\left(\frac{\mu^1_{Ti,j}}{\omega^0_{Ti}}\right), \tag{10}$$

$$g^0_{Ti}(m, b^0_{Ti}, \sigma^0_{Ti}) = \mu^0_{Ti}\left[\Phi\left(\frac{\mu^0_{Ti}}{\omega^0_{Ti}}\right) - \Phi\left(\frac{-\mu^0_{Ti}}{\omega^0_{Ti}}\right)\right] + 2\omega^0_{Ti}\phi\left(\frac{\mu^0_{Ti}}{\omega^0_{Ti}}\right), \tag{11}$$

$$\mu^1_{Ti,j} = \left(\frac{m+1}{2}\right)\left(b^1_{Ti,j}\right),\ \mu^0_{Ti} = \left(\frac{m+1}{2}\right) b^0_{Ti}, \tag{12}$$

and $\omega^0_{Ti} = \sigma^0_{Ti}\left(1 + \frac{1}{m}\right)^{1/2}$. To obtain $\left\{\hat{\psi}_j\right\}$, we use the HPJ-FE estimates of $\{\boldsymbol{\beta}_\ell\}^4_{l=0}$ and $\{\varphi_l\}^4_{l=1}$ from the ARDL equation with $\left|T_{it} - T^*_{i,t-1}(m)\right|$ as the climate variable. These estimates and their standard errors are reported in Table 2. Figure 2 plots the estimates of ψ_j for $j = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, 20$, for which the estimated mean lag is $\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} j\hat{\psi}_j}{\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \hat{\psi}_j} = 3.1943$ years.

To study the role of climate volatility in determining GDP per capita losses, instead of setting $\sigma^1_{Ti,j} = \sigma^0_{Ti}$, we allow temperature increases to affect the variability of temperature shocks commensurately. That is, we keep the coefficient of variation unchanged, and therefore set $\sigma^1_{Ti,j} = \left(\mu^1_{Ti,j}/\mu^0_{Ti}\right)\sigma^0_{Ti}$.

We compare the per capita GDP impact of temperature increases under various SSP

[10] Moreover, accounting for international spillover effects of climate change, individual countries' long-term growth effects could be larger.

Table 2: Effects of Climate Change on per Capita Real GDP Growth, 1960–2014

$\widehat{\beta}_0$	-0.0038*	$\widehat{\varphi}_1$	0.2643***	No. of Countries (N)	174
	(0.0021)		(0.0500)	$\max T$	50
$\widehat{\beta}_1$	-0.0056*	$\widehat{\varphi}_2$	0.0785***	avg$T$	38.36
	(0.0029)		(0.0266)	$\min T$	2
$\widehat{\beta}_2$	-0.0084***	$\widehat{\varphi}_3$	0.0547**	No. of Obs. ($N \times T$)	6,674
	(0.0031)		(0.0216)		
$\widehat{\beta}_3$	-0.0090***	$\widehat{\varphi}_4$	-0.0016		
	(0.0026)		(0.0327)		
$\widehat{\beta}_4$	-0.0060***				
	(0.0021)				

Notes: Estimates are based on $\Delta y_{it} = a_i + \sum_{\ell=1}^{4} \varphi_\ell \Delta y_{i,t-\ell} + \sum_{\ell=0}^{4} \beta_\ell^{'} \Delta x_{i,t-\ell}(m) + \varepsilon_{it}$,where y_{it} is the log of real GDP per capita of country i in year t, $x_{it}(m) = \left|T_{it} - T_{i,t-1}^{*}(m)\right|$, T_{it} is the population-weighted average temperature of country i in year t, and $T_{i,t-1}^{*}(m)$ is the historical temperature norm of country i (based on moving averages of the past 30 years). The coefficients are estimated by the HPJ-FE procedure and the standard errors are based on the estimator proposed in Proposition 4 of Chudik et al. (2018). Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.

Figure 2: $\{\psi_j\}$ for $j = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, 20$



Source: Kahn et al. (2021a).

scenarios to a baseline scenario under which temperature in each country rises according to its historical trend of 1960–2014. However, to have a better comparability to previous studies, we also perform a counterfactual exercise where temperature increases under the historical trend of 1960–2014 are compared to a baseline scenario without climate change and assuming that adaptation is extremely slow (i.e., historical norms are computed using moving averages with $m = 100$ in counterfactuals from 2015 onwards).

4 GDP Losses from Global Warming

We report the real GDP per capita losses from above-norm temperature increases under various SSP scenarios for the year 2100 compared to: (i) a baseline under which temperature in each country increases according to its historical trend of 1960–2014; and (ii) a commonly adopted baseline without climate change and with extremely-slow adaptation. We make all of the 174 *country-specific* estimates of annual income losses available to download from here. Figure 3 shows that income losses vary significantly across countries depending on the *country-specific* projected paths of temperatures, climate variability, and adaptation efforts.

Averaging the losses across countries, using PPP-GDP weights, we report that the global income effects of temperature warming relative to baseline (i) ranges from 5.4% under the SSP3-7.0 at the 90th percentile of model ensemble to 11% under the SSP5-8.5 scenario with slower adaptation (Figures 4 and 5). Climate variability amplifies the projected economic losses, with estimates surging to 12-14% globally with more variation across countries. However, while adaptation—encompassed within the Faster Adaptation scenarios—present a viable pathway to reducing the detrimental long-term growth effects, they fall short of completely neutralizing these impacts. This limitation suggests that adaptation, although beneficial, cannot serve as a standalone solution but rather as a critical component of a broader, more comprehensive approach to addressing the impacts of climate change. We, therefore, underscore the pressing need for climate change mitigation policies to slow global warming. Abiding by the Paris Agreement goals, thereby limiting the temperature increase to 0.01 degrees Celsius per year, generates an income benefit of 0.25 percent globally. Considering the additional income losses from temperature warming under the 1960–2014 trends relative to a baseline without climate change and assuming extremely-slow adaptation efforts brings the total losses under SSP5-8.5 scenario to 24 percent.

To put our results into perspective, Figure 6 compares our updated income loss estimates (shaded area) with those from select papers in the literature. While our counterfactual estimates are conservative (given the caveats mentioned in the introduction), they are non-negligible especially when the reference point of comparison is harmonized across studies. While almost all countries are likely to experience a fall in GDP per capita in the absence of climate change policies, the size of income effects varies across countries and regions.

Figure 3: Frequency Distribution of Income Losses Across 174 Countries by 2100



Notes: We consider income losses from increases in temperatures under various IPCC climate scenarios relative to a baseline in which temperatures increase according to their 1960-2014 trends. Numbers are PPP GDP weighted averages of $\Delta_{ih}(d_i)$, see equation (9), with $h = 86$ (corresponding to the year 2100). Under the "No Adaptation" assumption, historical norms are formed over 100 years (i.e., $m = 100$). We keep $\sigma^1_{Ti,j} = \left(\mu^1_{Ti,j}/\mu^0_{Ti}\right)\sigma^0_{Ti}$ under the "Volatile Climate" assumption.

Figure 4: Global Temperature Increase Under Climate Scenarios by 2100



Figure 5: Global Income Losses from Rising Temperatures by 2100



Notes: We consider persistent increases in temperatures based on various climate scenarios in Figure 4. Solid-color bars are PPP GDP weighted averages of $\Delta_{ih}(d_i)$, see equation (9), with $h = 86$ (corresponding to the year 2100). Pattern-fill bars show global income losses from a continuation of 1960-2014 trend temperature increases compared to a baseline scenario without climate change. For "Faster Adaptation", $m = 10$. For "Slower Adaptation", $m = 50$. For "No Adaptation", $m = 100$. For "Volatile Climate", $\sigma^1_{Ti,j} = \left(\mu^1_{Ti,j}/\mu^0_{Ti}\right)\sigma^0_{Ti}$.

The differential impact of average temperature increases across countries further emphasize the complexity of loss estimates. Countries situated in hotter climates and those classified as low-income likely face disproportionately higher losses, ranging from 30-60% above the global average. This disparity not only highlights the exacerbated vulnerability of these countries but also stresses the need for tailored climate strategies that address their specific challenges. Conversely, countries in colder climates are not spared from the adverse effects of climate change. The faster rate of temperature increases in these areas introduces unique challenges, despite Kahn et al. (2021a)'s finding that the marginal effect of average temperature increases in cold countries is 40 percent lower than that of the global average.

Figure 6: GDP Impact of Increases in Temperature



Sources: Kahn et al. (2021a), Tol (2024), and authors' estimates (shown as the shaded area in the chart). Notes: Projected GDP impact is for some future year, typically 2100. The shaded area represents the GDP per capita losses from our counterfactual exercise in Section 3 with the upper bound based on $m = 30$ and the lower bound based on $m = 100$.

5 Concluding Remarks

We estimated *country-specific* annual per-capita GDP losses from global warming using the most-recent climate scenarios of the IPCC under different mitigation, adaptation, and climate variability assumptions. We also showed that without significant mitigation and adaptation efforts, global GDP per capita could decline by up to 24 percent under the high-emissions climate scenarios by 2100, with these income losses varying greatly across the 174 countries in our sample. Our findings emphasize the importance of mitigating climate change and implementing adaptation measures to minimize these negative effects. However, even with adaptation policies, the long-term growth effects of climate change are likely to persist, particularly in countries with hotter climates and lower incomes. Urgent action is needed to address climate change and protect economies from further income losses.

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